The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation by Aziz, Haris et al.
The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation
Haris Aziz
UNSW Sydney and Data61 CSIRO
haris.aziz@unsw.edu.au
Xin Huang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
xhuang@cse.cuhk.edu.hk
Nicholas Mattei
Tulane University
nsmattei@tulane.edu
Erel Segal-Halevi
Ariel University
erelsgl@gmail.com
Abstract
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that
models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring
issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of wel-
fare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a welfare-
achieving allocation, we embed such an oracle into a flexible
algorithm called the Constrained Round Robin (CRR) algo-
rithm, that achieves the required welfare level. Our algorithm
also allows the system designer to lower the welfare require-
ments in order to achieve a higher degree of fairness. If the
welfare requirement is lowered enough, a strengthening of
envy-freeness up to one item is guaranteed. Hence, our al-
gorithm can be viewed as a computationally efficient way to
interpolate between welfare and approximate envy-freeness
in allocation problems.
Introduction
In multi-agent resource allocation, two orthogonal concerns
are efficiency, e.g., Pareto optimality or maximizing the sum
of utilities, and fairness, e.g., envy-freeness. In certain de-
ployed applications, such as assigning papers to reviewers,
the primary focus is on efficiency. But when the agents’ pref-
erences are highly correlated, there may be many different
efficient allocations, most of which are not fair. Indeed, fair-
ness concerns pose their own challenges. In several settings
concerning indivisible resources, a fair allocation may not
exist, and if it does exist — it might be hard to compute and
might fail to satisfy efficiency requirements.
Several recent works focus on a particular combination of
efficiency and fairness — finding an allocation that is both
Pareto-optimal (PO) and envy-free except one item (EF1).
Caragiannis et al. (2016) prove that any allocation maximiz-
ing the Nash welfare (the product of utilities) is both PO
and EF1, and Barman, Murthy, and Vaish (2018) present a
pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for finding a PO and EF1
allocation. These fascinating results are still limited in two
ways: (1) They do not provide any guarantee for more popu-
lar welfare goals such as utilitarian maximality (maximizing
the sum of utilities) or rank-maximality. (2) They work only
for the basic setting in which all utilities are weakly-positive
(i.e., all items are goods), there is a single copy of each item,
and there are no constraints on the number of items given
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to each agent. Thus they do not apply to practical problems
such as assigning conference-papers to reviewers in which
there are capacity constraints on both reviewers and papers
and where agents may have negative utilities for the tasks.
The central research question we examine is the follow-
ing one: “how can we find fair allocations that guarantee a
specified level of welfare/efficiency?”
Our Contribution. We consider a general allocation
problem in which the utility of each item for each agent can
be any real number (positive, negative, or zero), and there
may be capacity constraints on both agents and items. We fo-
cus on EF1 as the predominant fairness notion. We consider
utilitarian-maximality (UM) and rank-maximality (RM) as
the predominant efficiency notions, though our approach can
handle other efficiency notions.
Ideally, given a fairness and an efficiency requirement, we
would like to first decide whether there exists an allocation
that satisfies both requirements. If no such allocation exists,
we would like to find a fair allocation that is as efficient as
possible. However, we show that both these goals are com-
putationally hard even for three agents: (1) deciding whether
there exists an allocation that is both EF1 and UM, or both
EF1 and RM, is NP-complete; (2) computing an allocation
that is UM or RM within the set of EF1 allocations is NP-
hard.
In view of these issues, we present a general algorithm
that finds an efficient allocation in a way that is provably fair
for important classes of utility functions such as identical
utilities. It is inspired by the round robin (RR) protocol for
item allocation: In the RR protocol, each agent gets turns in a
round-robin manner and in turn picks an item. Our algorithm
is called Constrained Round Robin (CRR): it tries to find
an allocation in a round-robin manner, under the constraint
that the final allocation must satisfy a given efficiency goal.
For a given efficiency goal W, W-CRR is the corresponding
CRR algorithm specified with respect to W and it returns an
allocation satisfying W. In the special case in which W is
null (i.e, no welfare goal is imposed), we show that W-CRR
finds an EF1 allocation for all utilities consistent with the
ordinal preferences. We call this novel strengthening of EF1
necessary EF1 (NEF1).
The generality of CRR allows the system designer to
gradually increase the welfare requirements by modifying
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W, as long as the resulting allocation is sufficiently fair for
his/her needs. W-CRR can be considered a practical engi-
neering approach for interpolating between welfare and fair-
ness, re-using existing algorithms and implementations for
finding allocations that achieve a target welfare level. Us-
ing extensive simulation experiments on both real-world and
synthetic data, we examine W-CRR where W is utilitarian-
maximality or rank-maximality, and show that in many set-
tings W-CRR produces fairer allocations than several ex-
isting algorithms for maximum Nash welfare or maximum
Egalitarian welfare.
Related Work
Bouveret, Chevaleyre, and Maudet (2016) survey the main
algorithms and considerations in fair item allocation, includ-
ing fairness and welfare considerations.
A flexible approach to achieve varying levels of utilitar-
ian and egalitarian welfare is applying ordered weighted
averages over the agents’ total utilities (Yager 1988). The
approach smoothly interpolates between utilitarian welfare
and egalitarian welfare but it is computationally intractable.
There is also no known connection with EF1.
Nash welfare based approaches have been proposed to
achieve both Pareto optimality and EF1 (Caragiannis et al.
2016), but computing it is NP-hard. When there are addi-
tional side constraints such as agents getting an equal num-
ber of items, then EF1 is not implied by an allocation max-
imizing Nash welfare. Lian et al. (2018) proposed the Sum-
OWA Maximizing rule that uses ordered weighted averag-
ing over the agent’s individual utilities for items. They ex-
perimentally showed that the approach can reduce certain
measures of inequality. They did not establish whether the
approach achieves some formal notion of fairness for any of
the ordered vectors. The papers discussed assume that the
agents’ utilities are positive. On the other hand, W-CRR, in
general, can cater for positive or negative utilities.
Garg et al. (2010) considered the problem of assigning pa-
pers to referees and focused on maximizing the utility of the
worst off agent. They also considered rank maximal alloca-
tions when considering reviewer assignments. Rank maxi-
mality has been considered as a criterion when computing
desirable allocations (Paluch 2013).
Biswas and Barman (2018) considered fairness issues
when there are upper cardinality constraints on the cate-
gories of items in agents’ allocations. They did not consider
welfare measures.
Segal-halevi, Aziz, and Hassidim (2017) considered a
sub-class of additive valuations and characterized the con-
ditions under which allocations are necessarily envy-free
for all valuations in the sub-class. Segal-Halevi (2018) con-
sidered fairness-welfare interpolation in the division of a
heterogeneous resource (“cake-cutting”). The results cru-
cially depend on the divisibility of the cake. Caragiannis et
al. (2012) studied the fairness-welfare tradeoff through the
lens of the price of fairness — the ratio between the max-
imum welfare of an arbitrary allocation and the maximum
welfare of a fair allocation.
The complexity of computing a Pareto optimal and EF1
allocation is an open question in the literature (Caragiannis
et al. 2016; Barman, Murthy, and Vaish 2018). We show that
strengthening PO to maximum welfare immediately leads to
computational hardness.
Setting
Agents and Utilities
An allocation problem is a tuple (N,O,%, u, c) such that
N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents, O = {o1, . . . , om} is a set
of items and the preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) speci-
fies for each agent i his complete and transitive preference
%i over O. Agents may be indifferent among items, i.e.,
they provide weak rankings of the items. Hence, we denote
%i: E1i , . . . , E
ki
i for each agent i with equivalence classes in
decreasing order of preferences. We assume that each %i is
induced by a utility function ui : O→ R. In general the util-
ity of an item can be positive, negative or zero. Some of our
results apply only when all utilities have the same sign (all
positive or all negative). Agents are assumed to have additive
utility so that ui(O′) =
∑
o∈O′ ui(o).
When ui is not known to the algorithm (for example, when
the user interface does not allow the agents to submit their
cardinal utilities), we can still take a cardinal approach by
assuming that agent’s utility functions are derived by some
scoring rule, that ascribes a utility for an item being in a
given rank in the preference list. For example, in Borda scor-
ing, an agent with strict preferences over m items gives util-
ity m − i + 1 for the i-th ranked item (see e.g., (Baumeister
et al. 2017)).
An allocation p is a function p : N → 2O assigning each
agent a bundle of items. Typically it is assumed that each
item is allocated exactly once. However, we do not impose
such a restriction, since we want to capture scenarios such as
reviewer assignment, in which a paper is reviewed by multi-
ple agents.
There is a capacity function c, which specifies for each
agent i, the values ci and ci, which are the minimum and
maximum number of items that should be allocated to i.
Similarly, c specifies for each item o, the values co and co,
which are the minimum and maximum number of agents it
may be allocated to. Some of our results focus on the special
case where for all o, o′ ∈ O, co = co = co′ = co′ , and for all
i, i′ ∈ N, ci = ci′ and ci = ci′ and ci−ci = 1. The assumptions
are motivated by the conference reviewer assignment prob-
lem in which each paper is reviewed by the same number of
agents and all reviewers review almost the same number of
papers.
We denote the set of all feasible allocations (all alloca-
tions consistent with the capacity constraints) by A. An al-
location p ∈ A is called balanced if |(|p(i)| − |p( j)|)| ≤ 1 for
all i, j ∈ N.
The set of all utility functions consistent with %i is de-
noted by U(%i). In this paper we do not consider strategic
manipulations — we assume that all agents truthfully report
their valuations.
Fairness
An allocation p is envy-free (EF) if ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(p( j)) for all
i, j ∈ N. Although EF is often viewed as the gold-standard
for fairness, there may not exist an allocation that is EF. Fur-
thermore, checking whether such an allocation exists is NP-
complete (see e.g., (Bouveret and Lemaıˆtre 2015)).
An allocation p is envy-free up to one item (EF1) if for
all i, j ∈ N, there exists a subset O′ ⊆ O of cardinality at
most 1, such that either ui(p(i) \ O′) ≥ ui(p( j)) or ui(p(i)) ≥
ui(p( j) \ O′). Note that this definition makes sense for both
positive and negative utilities.
An allocation p satisfies necessary envy-freeness up to
one item (NEF1) if for all i, j ∈ N, there exists a subset
O′ ⊆ O of cardinality at most 1, such that for all ui ∈ U(%i),
either ui(p(i) \ O′) ≥ ui(p( j)) or ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(p( j) \ O′).
There is an equivalent way to write the definition of
NEF1. In the responsive set extension, preferences over
items are extended to preferences over sets of items in such
a way that a set in which an item is replaced by a more pre-
ferred item is more preferred. For two allocations p(i) and
q(i) of equal size, we write p(i) %RSi q(i) if there is a bijection
f from q(i) to p(i) such that for each o ∈ q(i), f (o) %i o. We
can then say that an allocation p is NEF1 if for all i, j ∈ N,
there exists a subset O′ ⊆ O of cardinality at most 1, such
that either p(i) \ O′ %RSi p( j) or p(i) %RSi p( j) \ O′. The
equivalence of definitions is based on results by Aziz et
al. (2015). NEF1 is a relaxation of the NEF concept as con-
sidered in a series of papers on fair allocation of indivisible
items (Aziz et al. 2015; Bouveret, Endriss, and Lang 2010;
Brams, Edelman, and Fishburn 2003).
Welfare
There are many notions of welfare. We particularly fo-
cus on the following two. An allocation p is utilitarian-
maximal (UM) if it maximizes the sum of utilities:
p ∈ arg maxq∈A∑i∈N ∑o∈q(i) ui(o). An allocation p is rank-
maximal (RM) if it maximizes the number of agents assigned
their 1st-best item, subject to that — it maximizes the num-
ber of agents assigned their 2nd-best item, and so on (see
e.g., (Irving et al. 2006; Manlove 2013)). Formally, for any
item o ∈ O, its rank in agent i’s preference list %i is j if
o ∈ E ji i.e., it is in i’s j-th equivalence class. For an allocation
p, its corresponding rank vector is r(p) = (r1(p), . . . , rm(p))
where r j(p) is the total number of times an item o is as-
signed to an agent for whom o has a rank of j. Formally:
r j(p) :=
∑
i∈N |E ji ∩ p(i)|. We compare rank vectors lexico-
graphically. A rank-vector r = (r1, . . . , rm) is better than an-
other rank-vector r′ = (r′1, . . . , r
′
m) if, for the smallest i such
that ri , r′i , it must hold that ri > r
′
i . An allocation p is
rank-maximal if: p ∈ arg maxq∈A r(q).
We note that rank maximality can be captured by im-
posing specific cardinal utilities for agents and then max-
imizing utility (Michail 2007). The specific cardinal utili-
ties are lexicographic: For an agent i getting an item o from
the j-th equivalence class, she gets utility (xm)m− j where
x = max{co : o ∈ O}.
Combining Welfare and Fairness
Before presenting our W-CRR algorithm, we explain the
rationale behind it. Our starting point is the observation
that there is a simple class of algorithms that always re-
turn NEF1 allocations — the recursively balanced sequen-
tial allocation. These sequential allocation algorithms are
parametrized by a pre-specified sequence of agent-turns.
In sequential allocation, when an agent gets a turn, she
picks a most preferred item that is not yet allocated (see
e.g., (Aziz, Walsh, and Xia 2015; Bouveret and Lang 2011;
Beynier et al. 2018)). In case of our general setting with
capacity constraints, an agent picks a most preferred item
that she can pick without violating the item capacity con-
straint. A sequence of turns is called recursively balanced
(RB) if at no point an agent has taken more than one turn
than another agent (see e.g., (Aziz, Walsh, and Xia 2015)).
For example for two agents and 4 items, the RB sequences
are 1212, 1221, 2121 and 2112. We are also interested in
the following subset of RB sequences. A sequence of turns
is called round-robin (RR) if, for some permutation pi of the
agents, the sequence is pi1, pi2, . . . , pin, pi1, pi2, . . . , pin, . . . For
example, for two agents and 4 items the RR sequences are
1212 and 2121. All sequential allocation algorithms are or-
dinal in nature because they ignore the cardinal information
in the utility function of the agents.
Note that an RB picking-sequence always returns a bal-
anced allocation. Therefore, if the capacity constraints rule
out some balanced allocations (e.g. one agent must get ex-
actly 3 items while another agent must get exactly 5 items),
then RB may not return a feasible allocation. However, it
always returns an approximately-fair allocation:
Proposition 1 (a) If all utilities are positive, then the out-
come of sequential allocation for any RB sequence is NEF1.
(b) If all utilities are negative, then the outcome of sequential
allocation for any RR sequence is NEF1.
Proof: (a) Let agent i’s allocation be s1, . . . , sk and agent
j’s allocation be t1, . . . , tk′ . Since the picking sequence is re-
cursively balanced, the allocation is balanced, which implies
that k′ ∈ {k − 1, k, k + 1}. Without loss of generality we let
k′ = k +1 by letting j get dummy items after her actual turns
have finished. Now let us look at the sequence of turns in
which the items are picked: {s1, t1}, . . . , {sk, tk}, {tk+1}. When
two items are paired in curly brackets, we do not distinguish
which one is picked first. Note that for each j ∈ {2, . . . , k′},
s j−1 %i t j because i picks s j−1 when t j is still available. Con-
sider the function f from p( j) \ {t1} to p(i) such that for each
t j ∈ p( j) \ {t1}, f (o) = s j−1. Hence p(i) %RSi p( j) \ {t1} and
therefore, p satisfies NEF1.
(b) The argument is similar. It works by removing the
most undesirable item allocated to the envious agent, instead
of the most desirable item allocated to the envied agent. 
Note that if all utilities are negative, the outcome of an RB
sequence that is not RR might not even be EF1 (consider
the sequence A,B,B). If utilities are mixed, then even the
outcome of an RR sequence might not be EF1 (Aziz et al.
2019).
Sequential allocation with respect to a round-robin se-
quence does not necessarily maximize any social welfare
function. Moreover, even EF1, which is weaker than NEF1,
might be incompatible with welfare-maximization require-
ments. It is well-known that EF1 is incompatible with UM
when there are no capacity constraints (for example, if Al-
ice’s utility for every item is higher than Bob’s utility, the
only UM allocation gives all items to Alice, which is obvi-
ously not EF1 for Bob). The following example shows that
this incompatibility also holds when all agents have an iden-
tical capacity constraint and when all utilities are based on
Borda scores, and it also holds for RM.
Example 1 There are 3 agents and 9 items, with a single
copy per item. The following table shows the utility of each
item to each agent:
Item: o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7 o8 o9
Agents 1,2: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Agent 3: 6 9 8 7 5 4 3 2 1
We first consider the case in which each agent’s capacity
is unbounded. In any utilitarian-maximal or rank-maximal
allocation, each item must be given to an agent who assigns
to it a highest utility. Therefore, Agent 3 must get (at least)
the set {o2, o3, o4}. This leaves the other two agents a total
utility of at most 24. So one of these agents gets a utility of
at most 12. This agent EF1-envies Agent 3.
Next, we consider the case in which each agent must get
exactly 3 items (i.e., the allocation must be balanced). Under
this constraint, utilitarian-maximal or rank-maximal imply
Agent 3 must get exactly {o2, o3, o4}. By the same argument,
no utilitarian-maximal or rank-maximal allocation is EF1.
Given this incompatibility, we would like to decide
whether there exists, among all welfare-maximizing alloca-
tions, one that is also fair. However, this can be computa-
tionally challenging. Below we show that, checking whether
a UM / RM and EF1 allocation exists is NP-complete when
there are at least three agents.
Proposition 2 For three agents, checking whether there ex-
ists an allocation that is both rank-maximal and EF1, or
both utilitarian-maximal and EF1, is NP-complete.
Proof: We reduce from Partition, which is the following
decision problem: given m numbers a1, . . . , am summing up
to 2S , is there a partition of the numbers into two sets
with each set of integers summing up to S ? Given an in-
stance of Partition, define an item-allocation instance with
m + 6 items: m number-items and 6 extra-items, denoted
e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6. Each item should be allocated once.
There are 3 agents with unbounded capacities and the fol-
lowing valuations:
Items: m number-items e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6
Alice: 0 5S , 4S , 3S , 2S , S , 0
Bob, Carl: u j(o j) = a j 4S , 3S , 2S , S , 5S , 5S
It is possible to give all agents their best item, so any RM
allocation must do so and give e1, e5, e6 to Alice, Bob and
Carl respectively. Subject to this, it is possible to give one
agent her 2nd-best item — this must be Alice, so she must
be given e2. Similarly, Alice must be given e3 and e4. The
same is true for any UM allocation.
Now, Bob and Carl have utility 5S , and they value Alice’s
bundle as 10S . Since the highest item-value for both Bob
and Carl is 4S , the allocation becomes EF1 iff each of them
gets a utility of exactly 6S , iff each of them gets a utility of
exactly S from the number-items, iff the allocation of these
items corresponds to an equal partition of the numbers. 
Remark 2 When there are two agents, checking whether
there exists an allocation that is both UM and EF1 is
polynomial-time solvable.
Proposition 3 For three agents, computing an allocation
that is utilitarian-maximal or rank-maximal within the set
of EF1 allocations is NP-hard.
Proof: Suppose there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that computes an allocation maximizing the utilitarian wel-
fare within the set of EF1 allocations. Then we can compute
the outcome of the algorithm and check whether its total
utilitarian welfare is equal to the maximum possible welfare
(which is well-known to be polynomial-time computable).
The two values are equal if and only if there exists an al-
location that is both UM and EF1. An analogous argument
holds for RM and EF1, where instead of the maximum util-
ity we consider the maximum rank-vector. 
The NP-hardness of computing an allocation that maxi-
mizes the utilitarian welfare within the set of EF1 alloca-
tions was proven independently and recently by Barman et
al. (2019). Proposition 3 is stronger in one respect that it
even holds for rank maximality.
We proved that deciding whether there exists a UM+EF1
allocation for 3 or more agent is NP-hard. The same is true if
we replace EF1 with the more “friendly” concept of PROP1
— proportionality up to at most a single item. An allocation
pi satisfies proportionality up to one item (PROP1) if for each
agent i ∈ N,
• ui(pi(i)) ≥ ui(O)/n; or
• ui(pi(i)) + ui(o) ≥ ui(O)/n for some o ∈ O \ pi(i); or
• ui(pi(i)) − ui(o) ≥ ui(O)/n for some o ∈ pi(i).
Proposition 4 When there are at least three agents, check-
ing whether there exists an allocation that is both UM and
PROP1 is NP-complete.
Proof: Similarly to the proof for UM+EF1, we reduce from
Partition. Given an instance of Partition with m num-
bers, define an item-allocation instance with m + 4 items:
m number-items plus 4 extra-items. The agents’ valuations
are:
Items: m number-items e1, e2, e3, e4
Alice: 0 3S/2, 3S/2, 3S/2, 3S/2
Bob, Carl: v(oi) = ai S , S , S , S
All agents value the set of all items as 6S , so the propor-
tional share per agent is 2S . Since the largest item-value for
both Bob and Carl is S , the allocation is PROP1 iff both Bob
and Carl get at least S from the number-items, iff the iff the
allocation of these items corresponds to an equal partition of
the numbers. 
The W-CRR Algorithm
In this section, we present the W-Constrained Round Robin
(W-CRR) Algorithm. It is parametrized by a target welfare
measure W.
While we are particularly interested in the case in which
W is UM or RM, we note that W can be any other welfare
notion, for example: maximum egalitarian welfare (Egal),
maximum Nash welfare (Nash), utilitarian welfare that is at
least some given threshold, Pareto optimality, etc. The idea
of W-CRR is to combine the required welfare guarantee with
a round-robin sequential allocation.
The algorithm tries to find an allocation as a result of
some recursively-balanced and if possible a round-robin pol-
icy. The policy is left unspecified at the start of the algorithm
and is searched for dynamically. While trying to obtain an al-
location as a result of an RB sequence, the algorithm makes
regular checks on whether the partial allocation obtained so
far can be completed so as to satisfy W. If this is not possi-
ble, then the algorithm carefully relaxes the requirement of
a recursively-balanced picking sequence. In this relaxation,
the algorithm prioritizes agents with smaller allocations to
make a pick.
The algorithm uses an oracle called W-Completion that
takes as input a partial allocation p and finds a feasible com-
plete allocation that extends p and satisfies W, or reports
that no such extension exists. The oracle solves the follow-
ing computational problem, which we also refer to as W-
Completion.
W-Completion
Input: (N,O,%, u, c) and a partial allocation p
Question: Does there exist a complete and feasible alloca-
tion p′ that extends p and satisfies W? (yes/no)
For several efficiency measures such as rank-maximality
and utilitarian-maximality, W-Completion can be reduced to
simply finding an allocation which satisfies W; see Lemma
1. If W is null, that is we do not impose any efficiency con-
straints, then W-CRR reduces to round-robin sequential al-
location. The W-CRR algorithm is specified as Algorithm 1.
Note that during the running of the algorithm W-CRR, as
we grow allocation p, we always ensure that there exists an
extension of p that also satisfies W. W-CRR needs to call the
W-Completion oracle once for each agent-item pair, for a to-
tal of mn times. Hence the following properties are obvious:
Proposition 5 For any welfare measure W and instance
I = (N,O,%, u, c): (1) If I has at least one allocation that
satisfies W, then W-CRR returns an outcome that satisfies W.
(2) If W-Completion can be solved in time T (I), then W-CRR
takes time mn · T (I).
W-CRR is inspired by the sequential allocation mecha-
nism that uses a round-robin picking sequence. Among the
agents who have the least number of items, it tries to give an
item to the agent with the lowest index.
Given an instance I, we denote by W(I) the set of alloca-
tions that satisfy target W.
Proposition 6 If W(I) contains the set of all balanced allo-
cations, then W-CRR is equivalent to a round-robin sequen-
tial allocation rule.
Combining Propositions 6 and 1 implies that, if W(I) con-
tains all balanced allocations, and if all utilities are positive
or all are negative, then W-CRR returns an allocation that is
not just EF1 but also NEF1.
Algorithm 1 W-CRR
Input: I = (N,O,%, u, c) and a target welfare measure W
that can be achieved by at least one feasible allocation.
Output: Allocation p
1 Initialize p to empty allocation {p will be gradually ex-
tended.}
2 j←− 1
3 O′ ←− O.
4 For each i ∈ N, initialize L′i = (E1i ′, E2i ′, ...) to Li =
(E1i , E
2
i , ...)
5 Nactive ←− N {Nactive is the set of agents with non-empty
preferences lists L′is}
6 while Nactive , ∅ and there exists a feasible extension of
p by giving a new item to some agent do
7 NMin ←− {i ∈ Nactive:@ j ∈ Nactive s.t. |p(i)| > |p( j)|}
{NMin is the set of agents among Nactive who have
least number of items}
8 if there exists an i ∈ NMin and o ∈ E1i ′ such that
W-Completion(p ∪ {(i, o)}) is yes {W-Completion
takes into account capacity constraints c} then
9 Choose such an i with the lowest index.
10 p ←− p ∪ {(i, o)} {Extend the current alloca-
tion by assigning item o to agent i}
11 else
12 For each i ∈ NMin, remove E1i ′ from L′i and re-
name the equivalence classes of L′i {rename so
that the next equivalence class is now named
E1i
′ and so on.}
13 Nactive ←− {i ∈ Nactive : L′i , empty}
14 return p.
Example 3 (Example illustrating W-CRR) Consider an
instance with 4 agents and 6 items, where each item should
be assigned to two different agents and each agent gets three
items. The following table shows the utility of each item to
each agent:
Item: o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6
Agents 1,2,3: 6 5 4 3 2 1
Agent 4: 2 6 5 4 3 1
Let the algorithm target at maximum utility i.e. W is max-
imum total utility. For simplicity, we assume that the round-
robin order is from agent 1 to 4 if there is a tie. Then the flow
of algorithm is as following:
• Agent 1 gets o1, Agent 2 gets o1, Agent 3 gets o2, Agent 4
gets o2.
• Agent 1 gets o3, Agent 2 gets o3, Agent 3 gets o4, Agent 4
gets o4.
• Agent 1 gets o5, Agent 4 gets o5 (at this time, Agents 2 and
3 cannot get their first choice o5, otherwise the maximum
utility constraint would be broken), Agent 2 gets o6, Agent
3 gets o6.
The final allocation is EF1, while maximizing total utility.
RM-CRR and UM-CRR
Since the W-CRR algorithm depends on a W-Completion
oracle, it is interesting to know for what W such W-
Completion oracles can be implemented efficiently. We now
show two cases in which W-Completion can be reduced to
just computing a single allocation that satisfies W: they are
rank-maximality and utilitarian-maximality. Rank-maximal
allocations with arbitrary upper capacities can be com-
puted efficiently by polynomial-time combinatorial algo-
rithms (Paluch 2013). Similarly, it is well-known that util-
itarian maximal allocations can be computed in polynomial
time even with capacity constraints (see e.g., (Korte and Vy-
gen 2012)).
Lemma 1 There exists a linear-time reduction – (a) from
UM-Completion to computing a utilitarian-maximal alloca-
tion; (b) from RM-Completion to computing a rank-maximal
allocation.
Proof: For part (a), consider a partial allocation p that re-
spects the upper capacities. Based on p, decrease the upper
and lower capacities, and find a utilitarian-maximal alloca-
tion q for the decreased capacities. Let r be the allocation
that combines p and q. Let wp,wq,wr be the utilitarian wel-
fare of p, q, r respectively, so that wr = wp + wq. Let w∗
be a maximal utilitarian welfare in the entire instance (note
that w∗ can be calculated once per instance — it need not be
calculated in each call to UM-Completion).
If wr ≥ w∗. then UM-Completion returns “yes”, since
r satisfies the (original) capacity constraints and attains
the maximum utilitarian welfare. If wr < w∗ then UM-
Completion returns “no”, since if there were a completion
q′ of p such that the completed allocation is utilitarian-
maximal, then we would have wp+wq′ ≥ w∗ > wr = wp+wq,
which would imply wq′ > wq, contradicting the maximality
of q with the decreased capacities.
For part (b), note that a rank-maximal allocation is just
like a utilitarian-maximal allocation with a vector-valued
welfare-function. 
From the lemma above, we get the following propositions.
Proposition 7 W-Completion can be solved in polyno-
mial time when W is (a) utilitarian-maximality, or (b)
rank-maximality. W-CRR can be computed in polynomial
time when W is (a) utilitarian-maximality, or (b) rank-
maximality.
We note that CRR aligns well with Borda welfare.
Proposition 8 Under strict preferences, positive Borda util-
ities and items having identical capacities, if the set
of feasible allocations contains all balanced allocations,
then W-CRR for any target social welfare W gives a 2-
approximation of maximum total Borda welfare.
Proof: We first prove that under strict preferences, the out-
put of any RB sequential allocation gives a 2-approximation
of maximum total Borda welfare. Let c be a positive inte-
ger. Suppose there are c copies of each item. We prove that,
in round-robin, the welfare in the k-th round increases by
at least m − b(k − 1)/cc. Then the total utility is at least
c(m + 1)m/2. To prove this, let us consider the worst case
for the k-th round. Suppose in the k-th round, agent i is the
one to choose his best item. Then in agent i’s perspective,
the worst case is that in each of the previous rounds, one of
his highest-utility item were taken. In such situation, agent i
gets utility m−b(k−1)/cc. Obviously, the maximum welfare
is at most cm2, which is attained when in each round the
utility increases by m. Combining these, we conclude that
RB sequential allocation gives a 2-approximation of Borda
welfare.
Now consider W-CRR for any target social welfare wel-
fare W If W is less than half the maximum total Borda wel-
fare, then CRR degenerates to any RB sequential allocation.
If the target welfare is more than half the maximum total
Borda welfare, then this target welfare is indeed achieved by
CRR. 
Empirical Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of W-CRR, we have
implemented it along with objectives UM, RM, Egal, Nash,
and
∑
-OWA Maximizing. In order to easily switch between
the various objective functions all models were implemented
in Gurobi 8.1 using the Python interface. All code from this
project will be released on GitHub. We have run experiments
on both real-world data from PrefLib (Mattei and Walsh
2017; Mattei and Walsh 2013) and data generated accord-
ing to a Mallows model.
In all of our experiments, we assume that agents have
Borda utilities and these are assigned at the level of the
equivalence class in the case of weak rankings from the re-
alworld data; this is common in much of the literature on
resource allocation and conference paper assignment (Lian
et al. 2018). In all of our experiments we enforce that all
agents and all items, respectively, have the same maximum
and minimum capacities. We also enforce that all agents may
receive only one copy of any particular item. For each of the
datasets, we report the fraction of the n(n − 1) relations be-
tween agents that satisfy EF, EF1, NEF, and NEF1.
Synthetic Data
We generate synthetic data using a Mallows model which
gives each agent a strict preference over the items and al-
lows us to measure the effect that correlation between the
agent preferences has on the overall results. For each setting
of the φ ∈ [0, 1] parameter, we generate 25 test instances
and report the mean and standard deviation of the proportion
of allocations satisfying the various evaluation criteria. We
tested for correlation φ ∈ {0.0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95}. The
value of 1 − φ indicates the level of correlation. For each φ,
we generated instances with 10 agents and 20 items. We set
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Figure 1: Mean performance of the seven objective functions
as we sweep φ for NEF1.
the agent minimum to 3 and maximum to 6, while for the
objects we set a minimum of 3 and maximum of 4.
Figure 1 shows the mean proportion of NEF1 relations
that are satisfied for each setting of φ and provides a good
visualization of the effect of correlation on the various algo-
rithms. We see here that UM-CRR and RM-CRR are able
to handle perfectly correlated preferences and provide a so-
lution that has less NEF1 relations than the Egal objec-
tive, which is NP-hard to compute. We also see that the
CRR refinement outperforms the UM or RM objective alone
for all settings to φ. Interesting in this graph is the good
performance of the
∑
-OWA objective with a linear OWA
(LSOWA). Similar trends exists for other measures NEF and
EF.
EF Relations
UM UM-CRR RM RM-CRR Nash Linear-
∑
OWA Egal
MD-2-01 0.955 0.975 0.965 0.975 0.922 0.657 0.934
MD-2-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.835 0.998
MD-2-03 0.725 0.709 0.717 0.709 0.724 0.85 0.819
EF1 Relations
UM UM-CRR RM RM-CRR Nash Linear-
∑
OWA Egal
MD-2-01 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.823 1.0
MD-2-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.944 1.0
MD-2-03 0.815 0.919 0.812 0.919 0.813 0.97 1.0
NEF Relations
UM UM-CRR RM RM-CRR Nash Linear-
∑
OWA Egal
MD-2-01 0.951 0.966 0.961 0.965 0.902 0.615 0.927
MD-2-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.723 0.998
MD-2-03 0.723 0.702 0.716 0.702 0.721 0.849 0.816
NEF1 Relations
UM UM-CRR RM RM-CRR Nash Linear-
∑
OWA Egal
MD-2-01 0.995 1.0 0.998 1.0 0.961 0.806 0.989
MD-2-02 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.918 1.0
MD-2-03 0.814 0.918 0.81 0.918 0.811 0.97 1.0
Table 1: Results of our CRR algorithms compared to various
baseline algorithms for the PrefLib datasets.
Real World Data
To measure the effectiveness of our algorithms on real-world
data we use three datasets from PrefLib: MD-2-01 – 03 are
from small computer science conferences with between 50–
175 papers and bids from 25–150 participants. For all of
these datasets, we set the capacity constraints so that each
item (paper) is assigned to at least 3 and at most 4 agents.
Each agent gets between 4 and 7 papers.
The results of CRR compared to other objectives are
shown in Table 1. The results are mixed and suggest that
there is a rich interplay between the exact bids received and
the outcomes of the various algorithms. Looking first at the
EF and EF1 relationships we see that the results are mixed,
for some settings, envy goes up when we run the CRR al-
gorithm while in others it actually decreases. However, for
the EF1 relations the CRR refinement is always better and
significantly so. Looking at the NEF and NEF1 relations we
see that the CRR algorithm delivers strictly better results in
terms of envy than the UM and RM objectives. It is interest-
ing to note that in some cases even using the Egalitarian ob-
jective does worse than the corresponding CRR algorithm.
However, in general, we see that using an Egalitarian objec-
tive, though it is NP-hard to optimize for, is a good way to
reduce envy on average.
Conclusions
We have presented a flexible algorithm called CRR that can
be parametrized with respect to the target welfare and it can
be used in conjunction with any feasibility constraints. Since
each system designer may have a different sweet spot be-
tween welfare and fairness concerns, the CRR algorithm can
cater to different ‘tastes.’ For any given welfare requirement,
our approach can be seen as providing a fairness serum to
the allocation process. We note that if agents have unequal
shares or different capacities, this can handled by the al-
gorithm by modifying NMin from NMin = {i ∈ N | @ j ∈
NActive s.t. |p(i)| > |p( j)|} to NMin = {i ∈ N : |p(i)| <
si∑
j∈N s j
| ∪ j∈N p( j)|}. We conclude by noting that revisiting
standard settings with the goal to incorporate real-life dis-
tribution constraints is an important research direction in
multi-agent resource allocation.
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A. Maximum Nash Welfare Does Not Imply
EF1 for Balanced Allocations: Example
There are 4 items, 2 agents, and each agent must get 2 items.
The valuations are:
• Alice: 5, 5, 2, 2
• Bob: 7, 7, 0, 0
There are three possible allocations:
• Alice gets 5,5 and Bob gets 0,0 – the Nash welfare is 0.
• Alice gets 5,2 and Bob gets 7,0 – the Nash welfare is
7*7=49.
• Alice gets 2,2 and Bob gets 7,7 – the Nash welfare is
4*14=56.
So the Nash-optimal allocation gives Alice a value of
2+2=4, but it is not EF1 for Alice. Note that without the
capacity constraints, the Nash-optimal allocation gives Al-
ice 5+2+2=9 and Bob 7, the Nash welfare is 63 and it is
indeed EF1.
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Figure 2: Graphs of the performance of the seven objective functions as we sweep φ for each of our evaluation metrics.
B. Stepping Graphs
Figure 2 captures the proportions of the various relations as
we sweep φ for each of the evaluation criteria. These plots
can be thought of as an aggregate view of the individual
boxplots found in the next section. Looking at this set of
graphs we see that the CRR refinements are outperforming
the UM and RM algorithms across the sweep of correlated
preferences. This difference is particularly noteworthy for
the NEF1 and NEF plots.
C. Individual Boxplots
Figures 3 through Figure 7 show the distribution of the re-
sults for each of the 25 trials for each of the settings to
φ ∈ {0.0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95}. These figures give a more
nuanced view of what is happening in the interplay between
preference correlation and the fairness of the assignments
that are found. Most interestingly is that, as seen in Figure 2
we see the CRR refinements beating out the underling UM
and RM allocations at each of the steps. Another interesting
aspect is that when preferences are random (φ ∈ 0.95) all
algorithms are particularly good at finding fair allocations.
The real interesting areas to focus on are when preferences
are correlated but not perfectly so. In these cases, e.g., Fig-
ure 3 that NEF is indeed a very stringent requirement and
none of the algorithms can guarantee more than 50% of the
relations satisfy the measure. However, NEF1 is interesting
in that many of the algorithms, and especially the CRR al-
gorithms, are able to find an allocation satisfying NEF1 for
over 80% of the pairs.
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Figure 3: Boxplots for φ = 0.
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Figure 4: Boxplots for φ = 25.
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Figure 5: Boxplots for φ = 50.
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Figure 6: Boxplots for φ = 75.
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Figure 7: Boxplots for φ = 0.95.
